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  “Any government wanting to kill an opponent…would not try it at a meeting with 
  government  officials.” 
      —comment on the poisoning of Ukrainian presidential candidate (now 
      president) Viktor Yushchenko, quoted in C. J. Chivers (2004)   
  “…in Lake Wobegon, the correct answer is usually ‘c’.” 
  —Garrison  Keillor (1997) on multiple-choice tests, quoted in Yigal Attali 
    and Maya Bar-Hillel (2003) 
Abstract: “Hide-and-seek” games are zero-sum two-person games in which one player wins by 
matching the other's decision and the other wins by mismatching. Although such games are often 
played on cultural or geographic “landscapes” that frame decisions non-neutrally, equilibrium 
ignores such framing. This paper reconsiders the results of experiments by Rubinstein, Tversky, 
and others whose designs model non-neutral landscapes, in which subjects deviated systematically 
from equilibrium in response to them. Comparing alternative explanations theoretically and 
econometrically suggests that the deviations are well explained by a structural non-equilibrium 
model of initial responses based on “level-k” thinking, suitably adapted to non-neutral landscapes.     
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Close and Michael Douglas (http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0093010/) were no help at all.                                                                              Game theorists have been intrigued by hide-and-seek games—zero-sum two-person 
games in which one player wins by matching the other’s decision and the other wins by 
mismatching—for more than 50 years (John von Neumann (1953)). These games cleanly model a 
strategic problem that is central to many economic, political, and social settings as well as the 
obvious military and security applications. Examples include entry games where entry requires a 
differentiated product and blocking it requires matching the entrant's design; election campaigns in 
which a challenger can win only by campaigning in different areas than the incumbent; and fashion 
games in which hoi polloi wish to mimic the elite but the elite prefer to distinguish themselves.  
Although zero-sum two-person games are one of game theory’s success stories, equilibrium 
analysis of hide-and-seek games is not very helpful as a guide to prediction or decision-making. 
There seem to be two main reasons for this, both illustrated by our epigraphs: Hide-and-seek games 
are often played without clear precedents, so equilibrium depends on strategic thinking rather than 
learning; but such thinking may not follow the fixed-point logic of equilibrium. A game theorist 
would reply to our first epigraph, “But if investigators thought that way, a meeting with 
government officials is precisely where a government would try to kill an opponent.” Further, hide-
and-seek games are usually played on naturally occurring cultural or geographic “landscapes” that 
are non-neutral across locations in framing and/or payoffs. Equilibrium ignores such landscapes 
except as they affect payoffs, but non-equilibrium thinking may respond to them. 
Both reasons are also well illustrated by the experimental results of Rubinstein and Tversky 
(1993; “RT”) and Rubinstein et al. (1996; “RTH”); see also Rubinstein (1999; “R”). RT, RTH, and 
R (collectively “RTH”) elicited subjects’ initial responses to hide-and-seek games. RTH explained 
the games as “stories,” probably increasing subjects’ comprehension. In a leading example, R told 
seekers: “You and another student are playing the following game: Your opponent has hidden a 
prize in one of four boxes arranged in a row. The boxes are marked as follows: A, B, A, A. Your 
goal is, of course, to find the prize. His goal is that you will not find it. You are allowed to open 
only one box. Which box are you going to open?” Hiders were told an analogous story. Thus the 
entire structure, including the order and labeling of locations, was publicly announced.
2
This story makes the framing of locations non-neutral in two ways. The “B” location is 
distinguished by its label, and so is salient in one of Thomas Schelling’s (1960) senses. And the 
                                                 
2RT's and RTH's subjects' payments appeared sufficient to motivate them, and the binary-lottery structure of the payoff 
function implies under standard assumptions that players maximize expected money payoffs, without regard to risk 
preferences. Note however that in R's experiments, subjects were not paid or screened for exposure to game theory. 
  1two “end A” locations, though not distinguished by their labels, may be inherently salient, as RT 
and RTH argue, citing Nicholas Christenfeld (1995). As RT note, these two saliencies interact to 
give the remaining location, “central A,” its own brand of uniqueness as “the least salient location.” 
This aspect of their designs is important as a tractable abstract model of a naturally occurring 
landscape. 
Figure 1 translates RTH's story into a payoff matrix. Because the seeker chooses without 
observing the hider’s choice, their choices are strategically simultaneous. If the seeker chooses the 
same location as the hider, he wins a payoff normalized here to one; if not, the hider wins that 
payoff. This game has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies, in which both players randomize 
uniformly across locations, independent of their framing. Because the seeker can choose only one 
of the four locations, he is at a disadvantage in equilibrium, finding the prize only 25% of the time. 
Despite this clear equilibrium prediction, RTH’s publicly announced order and labeling of 
locations create a potential for framing effects, and their subjects deviated systematically from 
equilibrium in ways that were highly sensitive to framing.
3 Table 1 gives the aggregate choice 
frequencies for the “RTH-4” treatment described above and RTH's most closely related other 
treatments (Table A1 in the web appendix gives frequencies from less closely related treatments). 
In RTH-4, central A was the strongly modal choice for both hiders and seekers, and was even more 
prevalent for seekers than hiders. As a result, assuming independence, seekers could expect to find 
the prize 32% of the time, substantially more than the 25% equilibrium predicts. These qualitative 
patterns extend, properly interpreted, to the other five treatments in Table 1, which we shall argue 
are closely analogous to RTH-4. They also extend with minor exceptions to a very large sample 
from more recent internet experiments (Ariel Rubinstein, private communication). 
Like the beliefs that underlie our epigraphs, these patterns are an intriguing puzzle: If hiders 
and seekers are equally intelligent, on average, why don't hiders tempted to hide in central A realize 
that seekers will also be tempted to look there? Why do hiders allow seekers to find them 32% of 
the time when they could hold it down to 25% via the equilibrium mixed strategy? The puzzle is 
                                                 
3The p–values from chi-square tests for significant differences from equilibrium in hiders’ and seekers’ choice 
frequencies in RTH’s six treatments are shown in Table 1. Although in this game any strategy, pure or mixed, is a best 
response to equilibrium beliefs, systematic deviations of aggregate choice frequencies from equilibrium probabilities 
must (with high probability) have a cause that is partly common across players, and are therefore indicative of 
systematic deviations from equilibrium. Other studies of framing effects in different kinds of games include Jörn 
Scharlemann et al. (2001), who studied trust games in which otherwise anonymous players were “labeled” by 
photographs; and Judith Mehta et al. (1994) and Nicholas Bardsley et al. (2006), who studied coordination games in 
which decisions had naturally occurring labels, as in Schelling’s (1960) classic experiments.   
  2deepened by the patterns’ robust asymmetry across player roles. Why do seekers choose central A 
more often than hiders? Although the payoff structure is asymmetric, this asymmetry is not 
explained by noisy generalizations of equilibrium such as Richard McKelvey and Thomas Palfrey’s 
(1995) quantal response equilibrium (“QRE”), which coincides with equilibrium in RTH's games.   
RTH took their subjects’ deviations from equilibrium as prima facie evidence that the 
subjects did not think strategically; and with one exception, explained below, they did not consider 
alternative explanations of their results.
4 But in our view, such robust patterns of behavior are 
unlikely to lack a coherent explanation; and given the simplicity of the strategic question hide-and-
seek games pose, the explanation is unlikely to be nonstrategic. On the contrary, deviations from 
equilibrium in games where its rationale is especially strong seem to offer a particularly promising 
opportunity to explore alternative strategic theories of initial responses to games. 
In this paper we propose an explanation of RTH’s and related results using a non-equilibrium 
model of initial responses to games based on "level-k" thinking, building on Bacharach and Stahl’s 
(1997a) analysis of a simplified version of RTH’s games.
5 Level-k models were introduced by 
Stahl and Paul Wilson (1994, 1995) and Rosemarie Nagel (1995) and further developed by Teck-
Hua Ho et al. (1998), Costa-Gomes et al. (2001), Vincent Crawford (2003), Colin Camerer et al. 
(2004), Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006), and Crawford and Nagore Iriberri (2005). They have 
strong experimental support, which should allay the concern that once one relaxes equilibrium, 
anything is possible. Like RTH, we focus on hide-and-seek and related games played on landscapes 
that are non-neutral in the framing of locations but neutral with regard to payoffs.
6 Although 
learning may converge to equilibrium over time, we also follow RTH in studying subjects’ initial 
responses, which reveal their strategic thinking most clearly. Our goals are to resolve a long-
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
4In RT's words, “The finding that both choosers and guessers selected the least salient alternative suggests little or no 
strategic thinking.” In RTH's words, “…the players employed a naïve strategy (avoiding the endpoints), that is not 
guided by valid strategic reasoning. In particular, the hiders in this experiment either did not expect that the seekers too, 
will tend to avoid the endpoints, or else did not appreciate the strategic consequences of this expectation.”  
5Bacharach and Stahl’s (1997a) analysis of hide-and-seek games did not appear in the published version of their paper, 
Bacharach and Stahl (2000). Bacharach and Stahl (1997b), whose title suggests a more detailed version of their hide-
and-seek analysis, is no longer available. The relationship between their analysis and ours is explained below.  
6Robert Rosenthal et al. (2003) and papers cited there report experiments on hide-and-seek games with non-neutral 
payoffs but neutral framing. Camerer et al. (2004, p. 883) show that level-k models can explain subjects’ responses to 
such games. Crawford, Gneezy, and Rottenstreich (2007) propose a level-k explanation along the lines suggested here 
of coordination experiments in which subjects respond strongly to both labeling and salience created by payoff 
perturbations, which opposes label salience in one player role but reinforces it in the other. Von Neumann (1953) 
characterized equilibria in hide-and-seek games whose payoffs vary with location, including a two-dimensional game 
in which a hider hides in a matrix and a seeker guesses the hider’s row or column. 
  3standing behavioral puzzle; to explore the specification of level-k models for games played on non-
neutral landscapes; and to establish a link between RTH’s results and experimental work on 
strategic thinking, and so bring new evidence to bear on modeling initial responses to games. 
Our level-k model allows behavior to be heterogeneous, but it assumes that each player 
follows a rule drawn from a common distribution over a particular hierarchy of decision rules or 
types. Type Lk for k > 0 anchors its beliefs in a nonstrategic L0 type and adjusts them via thought-
experiments with iterated best responses: L1 best responds to L0, L2 to L1, and so on. L1 and 
higher types have accurate models of the game and they are rational in that they choose best 
responses to beliefs. Their only departure from equilibrium is replacing its assumed perfect model 
of others’ decisions with simplified models that avoid the complexity of equilibrium analysis. 
In applications the population type frequencies are usually estimated from the current dataset 
or translated from previous work. The estimated distribution tends to be stable across games and 
hump-shaped, with most weight on L1, L2, and L3. Thus the anchoring L0 type exists mainly in the 
minds of higher types. Even so, its specification is the main issue that arises in defining a level-k 
model for games with non-neutrally framed locations, and the key to its explanatory power. 
We show that a level-k model with an L0 that is insensitive to payoffs and symmetric across 
player roles, but sensitive to framing in that L0 is constrained to favor salient locations, as seems 
plausible for a payoff-insensitive anchoring type, allows a simple explanation of RTH’s and related 
results. Estimating the model with population type frequencies and L0's choice probabilities 
constrained to be equal across roles yields a type distribution like those previously estimated for 
other games, though with somewhat more weight on higher types than usual, perhaps due to the 
transparency of the strategic question hide-and-seek games pose. The estimated mixture of types’ 
best responses to such an L0 explains subjects’ robust, role-asymmetric deviations from 
equilibrium, with no difference in behavioral assumptions for hiders and seekers. 
Although our proposed level-k model yields a plausible resolution of the puzzle posed by 
RTH’s results, its large number of parameters and the freedom to specify L0 raise concerns about 
overfitting within RTH's sample and portability, the extent to which estimating the model for 
RTH's games helps to predict behavior in other games. We address these concerns by comparing it 
with four alternatives: two level-k models that relax the constraints that L0 favors salience and/or is 
role-symmetric; and two equilibrium models as close as possible to the mainstream, with “hard-
wired” payoff perturbations that can describe an instinctive attraction to salience for seekers and an 
  4instinctive aversion for hiders, one with their magnitudes (but not signs) restricted to be the same 
for hiders and seekers and one with their magnitudes unrestricted. The web appendix extends these 
equilibrium comparisons to QRE with perturbations, which never performs better than equilibrium 
with perturbations, and sometimes performs worse. The alternative models can also explain RTH’s 
results, usually with a small likelihood advantage over our proposed model. But they too have large 
numbers of parameters, and they raise similar concerns about overfitting and portability. 
We test for overfitting within RTH's sample by using each model to compute estimates 
separately for each of their six treatments and using each estimated model to “predict” the results of 
the other five treatments. Overall, our proposed level-k model fits slightly worse than all four 
alternatives. But it has a lower mean squared prediction error (“MSE”) than each alternative but the 
level-k model that relaxes the constraint that L0 is role-symmetric, whose error is 10% lower. 
We evaluate portability by using each model to “predict” subjects’ initial responses in Barry 
O’Neill’s (1987) and Amnon Rapoport and Richard Boebel’s (1992) experiments, whose games are 
strategically close to RTH's games but with more complex win-loss patterns, different framing, and 
in one case five locations. The equilibrium with perturbations models are easily adapted to 
O’Neill’s game using the same general notions of salience as for RTH's games; but in each case the 
perturbations estimated under the natural constraints regarding how players react to salience are 0, 
reducing the model to an equilibrium model, which predicts O’Neill’s subjects’ initial responses 
poorly. The level-k models adapt just as easily and predict well. For O’Neill’s game our proposed 
level-k model with a role-symmetric L0 that favors salience has lower MSE than any of the 
alternative models. The level-k models with role-symmetric L0 adapt easily to Rapoport and 
Boebel’s more complex game; but there is no plausible, parsimonious way to adapt a model with a 
role-asymmetric L0 or the equilibrium with perturbations models to that game. Our proposed model 
has total MSE slightly lower than equilibrium or a level-k model with a role-symmetric L0 that 
avoids salience. The analysis traces our proposed model’s advantage in portability to its reliance on 
general principles of strategic behavior that are not overly sensitive to the details of the structure. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I explains the analogies among RTH's 
six treatments and the case for pooling their data the way we do. Sections II and III describe our 
equilibrium with perturbations and level-k models. Section IV reports econometric estimates, 
Section V discusses overfitting, and Section VI discusses portability. Section VII is the conclusion.     
  5I. Analogies across RTH’s Treatments 
This section describes the five other RTH treatments in Table 1 and explains the senses in 
which they are analogous to the RTH-4 treatment. We then argue that, properly interpreted, the 
patterns of deviations from equilibrium in RTH-4— that central A was modal for both hiders and 
seekers, and even more prevalent for seekers—extend to the other five treatments. We also test 
whether the choice frequencies in RTH's six treatments can be pooled in the econometric analysis. 
In RTH-4 the hider hid a desirable “prize,” which we call a “treasure” as in RTH (1996). The 
five other treatments include three more treasure treatments, RT-AABA-Treasure, RT-1234-
Treasure, and R-ABAA. They also include two “mine” treatments, RT-AABA-Mine and RT-1234-
Mine, identical to the corresponding treasure treatments except that the hidden object is 
undesirable, so that hiders’ and seekers’ 0-1 payoffs are interchanged. This yields an equivalent 
normal form with players’ roles reversed, leaving equilibrium predictions unchanged. 
However, because hiders inherently move first, even though seekers do not observe their 
choices mine treatments have different extensive forms than treasure treatments with reversed 
roles. RTH, suspecting that this difference might make it easier for seekers to mentally simulate 
hiders’ choices, used mine treatments to test whether it explains why seekers in treasure treatments 
did better than equilibrium predicts. But the mine treatments yielded results very close to the 
treasure treatments with roles reversed, which suggests that the seekers' advantage was somehow 
driven by subjects’ responses to the normal-form structure, as in all of the models considered here. 
In the three ABAA or AABA Treasure treatments and the AABA Mine treatment, central A 
was modal for both hiders and seekers. This pattern extends to the 1234 Treasure and Mine 
treatments if we follow RT’s suggestion that “the least salient response…may correspond to 3, or 
perhaps 2” and take 2 as analogous to B and 3 to central A. Given this correspondence, central A 
was more prevalent for seekers in all four treasure treatments and more prevalent for hiders in both 
mine treatments. Thus if hiders in treasure and seekers in mine treatments are treated as equivalent, 
this pattern is also the same in all six treatments. Further, the frequencies with which seekers found 
a treasure or a mine exceeded 25%, so that seekers (hiders) had higher (lower) expected payoffs 
than in equilibrium in treasure treatments, and vice versa in mine treatments. 
From now on we build in these analogies by treating 2 as equivalent to B, and treating mine 
treatments as equivalent to treasure treatments with reversed player roles. To avoid unnecessary 
repetition, we use “central A” to refer to either a central A or a 3 location, and so on; and we refer 
  6to mine treatments as if they were treasure treatments with reversed roles. No theory of which we 
are aware could predict these equivalences across different frames; their justification is that they 
allow us to use a more general theory of strategic behavior to interpret the patterns in the data.    
After transforming the data accordingly, chi-square tests for differences in subjects' aggregate 
choice frequencies reveal no significant difference for seekers (p-value 0.4836) or hiders (p-value 
0.1635) across the six treatments. We therefore pool the data except as noted. The pooled sample 
includes 624 hiders and 560 seekers, with the aggregate choice frequencies in Table 3.
7  
II. An Equilibrium with Payoff Perturbations Model of RTH’s Games 
  To fix ideas, we begin with an explanation of RTH’s results as close as possible to the 
mainstream, an equilibrium model with hard-wired payoff perturbations that can describe an 
instinctive attraction to salience for seekers and an instinctive aversion for hiders. Because the end 
As' frequencies are almost equal in the data, we set their perturbations equal for simplicity. Thus, 
we assume that seekers gain an additional payoff of e for an end A location or f for the B location; 
and that hiders lose the same payoffs for those choices, yielding the perturbed matrix in Figure 2. 
Given the signs of the perturbations, intuition suggests that e, f > 0; but we do not assume this here. 
First restrict the magnitudes of e and f to be the same for hiders and seekers as in Figure 2. If 
–1 < (f – 2e), (2e – 3f), (2e + f) < 3, the perturbed game has a unique, symmetric, totally mixed 
equilibrium, with hiders and seekers both playing A, B, A, A with probabilities 1/4–e/2+f/4, 1/4+ 
e/2–3f/4, 1/4+e/2+f/4, and 1/4–e/2+f/4. Both hiders and seekers play central A with probability 
1/4+e/2+f/4, which is greater than 1/4 when 2e + f > 0. A seeker finds the treasure with probability: 
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which is greater than 1/4 for e, f > 0. Thus, equilibrium with perturbations of equal magnitudes but 
opposite signs for hiders and seekers can explain why central A is modal for both roles if 2e + f > 0, 
but not its greater prevalence for seekers. It can only explain the role-asymmetry in RTH's results 
by invoking differences in the magnitudes of e and f, with 2e + f nearly twice as large for hiders as 
for seekers (Table 3). There is no logical reason why the game’s role-asymmetric payoffs should 
not evoke instinctive reactions that differ this way, but neither to our knowledge is there any 
                                                 
7We made minor adjustments to RTH’s published data to reconcile reported frequencies and sample sizes (web 
appendix). Pairwise tests suggest that RTH-4 has somewhat higher frequencies of B (as well as central A) for both hiders 
and seekers. Although this difference is intriguing, we focus on explaining the more robust patterns discussed in the text. 
  7plausible theory to explain such differences. Without such a theory, perturbations of unrestricted 
magnitudes give the model enough flexibility to explain virtually any pattern of behavior, raising 
concerns about overfitting; and the lack of a theory also raises concerns about portability. (These 
issues are discussed in more detail in the web appendix.) 
In RTH's unperturbed game, QRE coincides with equilibrium for any value of its precision 
parameter. But because QRE explains deviations from equilibrium in some other experiments, and 
it normally responds to payoff asymmetries, it is natural to hope that QRE with perturbations can 
explain RTH's results without unexplained differences in the magnitudes of the perturbations.
8 We 
consider this possibility in the web appendix, focusing on the popular logit specification and 
assuming e, f > 0 in Figure 2, which seems compelling. With perturbations of equal magnitudes 
QRE, like equilibrium, can explain why central A is model for hiders and seekers, but it robustly 
predicts that central A is more prevalent for hiders, the opposite of what RTH found. Perturbations 
of unrestricted magnitudes yield an effectively infinite estimate of QRE's precision parameter, 
reducing it to equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations. Thus QRE is unhelpful in this setting. 
III. A Level-k Model of RTH’s Games  
This section introduces our proposed level-k model for RTH’s games and alternative level-k 
models. Each player follows one of five types, L0, L1, L2, L3, or L4, with given probabilities in 
each role r, s, t, u, and v. Type Lk for k > 0 anchors its beliefs in type L0 and adjusts them via 
thought-experiments with iterated best responses: L1 best responds to L0, L2 to L1, and so on.
9 For 
k > 0 these responses determine types' normal choices, with ties broken uniformly randomly. 
For econometric reasons (Section IV) we assume r = 0, so the anchoring type L0 exists only 
in the minds of higher types, as the starting point for their strategic thinking. Even so, L0 is the key 
to the model’s explanatory power. We also assume that L0 is payoff-insensitive as in most previous 
level-k analyses; this choice is discussed below. In games with symmetric framing and sets of 
decisions like those we study, it is plausible to assume that a payoff-insensitive L0 is symmetric 
                                                 
8Rosenthal et al. (2003) find that QRE gives a reasonable explanation of the qualitative features of subjects’ role-
asymmetric deviations from equilibrium in 2x2 hide-and-seek games with neutral framing but varying payoffs. 
9Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006) summarize the experimental evidence for the level-k model, and give support for 
our assumptions that L2 best responds to an L1 without decision errors, and to L1 alone rather than a mixture of L1 and 
L0, etc., unlike in Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) or (in the latter case) Camerer et al. (2004). In RTH’s games L5’s 
choice probabilities (but not its expected payoffs) are the same as L1’s, so L5 is equivalent to L1, L6 to L2, and so on. 
  8across player roles.
10 We further assume that L0 probabilistically favors salient locations: B and the 
end As in RTH's games. Because the end A frequencies are almost equal in the data, we set their 
choice probabilities for L0 (and so for higher types) equal for simplicity. Thus, in RTH’s games L0 
hiders and seekers both choose A, B, A, A with probabilities p/2, q, 1– p – q, p/2, where p > 1/2 and 
q > 1/4. 
When r = 0, the model’s implications apart from errors are determined by L1 hiders’ and 
seekers’ best responses to L0, which determine the normal choices of L2, L3, and L4 as well as L1; 
and by the type frequencies s, t, u, and v. Table 2 lists types’ normal choice probabilities when p > 
1/2 and q > 1/4, distinguishing the cases p < 2q—in which L0 responds more strongly to the 
salience of a B than an end A location—and p > 2q. L1 hiders choose central A to avoid L0 seekers, 
and L1 seekers avoid central A in their searches for L0 hiders, choosing B if p < 2q or the end As 
(with equal probabilities) if p > 2q. For similar reasons, L2 hiders choose central A with probability 
1/3 or 1/2 and L2 seekers choose it with probability 1; L3 hiders avoid central A and L3 seekers 
choose it with probability 1/3 or 1/2; and L4 hiders and seekers avoid central A.
11
These choice patterns allow the model to explain RTH’s results with behaviorally plausible 
type frequencies. Table 2’s bottom lines give the population choice probabilities as functions of the 
type frequencies and the error rate ε. Section IV’s econometric analysis (Table 3) confirms that a 
role-symmetric L0 with p > 2q and a population with 19% L1, 32% L2, 24% L3, and 25% L4 
players in each role closely matches RTH’s hiders’ and seekers’ choice frequencies. This almost 
hump-shaped type distribution is like those estimated for other settings (Stahl and Wilson (1994, 
1995); Camerer et al. (2004); Costa-Gomes and Crawford (2006)). It is, however, shifted upward 
somewhat, perhaps due to the transparency of the strategic question hide-and-seek games pose.
12
Imagine, more concretely, that in the situation of our first epigraph there are four dinners at 
which the government could try to poison Yushchenko. Dinner “B” is with government officials; 
but none of the others is salient the way RTH’s end locations are. As the only salient location, B is 
the modal choice for L0 poisoners and investigators. L1 poisoners avoid B, but L1 investigators 
                                                 
10 One might argue that the framing isn’t completely role-symmetric because the roles have different labels, but RTH’s 
failure to find significant differences between the behavior of hiders in treasure treatments and seekers in mine 
treatments, and vice versa (Section I), suggests that role-asymmetric framing is not what is driving subjects’ behavior.      
11These choices remain the same whenever p + 2q > 1 and 3p + 2q > 2; we maintain p > 1/2 and q > 1/4 for simplicity. 
12This shift hints at the possibility of a more general theory that relates the type frequencies to the transparency and 
cognitive difficulty of the game. In contrast to RTH’s interpretation of their results as evidence of strategic naïveté, 
using our level-k model to explain their results implies lower bounds on the population's sophistication in that, for 
central A to be more prevalent for seekers than hiders, there must be sufficiently more L2 and L3 than L1 subjects. 
  9choose it. L2 poisoners and investigators both avoid B. L3 poisoners choose B, but L3 investigators 
avoid it. L4 poisoners and investigators both choose B. Thus our first epigraph may reflect the 
reasoning of an L1 poisoner, or equivalently of an L2 investigator reasoning about an L1 poisoner. 
The game referred to in our second epigraph, between a test-taker trying to guess the answer 
and a test-maker trying to minimize a guesser’s chances, is exactly like RTH's games if location 
“c” is treated as equivalent to central A. Thus our second epigraph may reflect the reasoning of an 
L1 test-maker, or an L2 guesser reasoning about an L1 test-maker. Attali and Bar-Hillel (2003) 
present intriguing field evidence on this game, from the Israeli analog of the U.S. Scholastic 
Aptitude Test. 
Like equilibrium with perturbations, our level-k model is quite flexible, and the freedom to 
specify L0 makes it even more flexible. Our payoff-insensitive L0 assumes that a player processes 
the game's decisions and framing before its payoffs. We show in Section IV that two alternative 
level-k models fit RTH’s data slightly better than our proposed model: one that merges those 
processing steps as in Bacharach and Stahl’s (1997a) payoff-sensitive, role-asymmetric L0 in 
which seekers favor salience and hiders avoid it; and one with a payoff-insensitive, role-symmetric 
L0 that avoids salience.
13 Section II’s equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations model fits RTH’s 
data best of all the models discussed here, but still only slightly better than our proposed model.  
Despite our proposed model’s slightly worse fit in RTH’s dataset, we find its explanation of 
their results more convincing because its assumptions seem behaviorally more plausible and it does 
not rely on unexplained role differences in behavior or payoffs. To our knowledge, only a level-k 
model with a role-symmetric L0 can explain the robust patterns in RTH’s data without unexplained 
differences in behavioral assumptions across roles. A payoff-insensitive L0 that avoids salience 
seems perverse, given that it responds only to decisions and framing. And a payoff-sensitive, role-
asymmetric L0 suffers from the same over-flexibility and lack of theory to guide its specification as 
equilibrium with perturbations. Sections V’s and VI’s analyses give support for these subjective 
judgments by showing that our proposed model has advantages in overfitting and portability. 
(These issues are discussed in more detail in the web appendix.) 
                                                 
13Bacharach and Stahl (1997a) analyze a simplified version of RTH's game with three locations, one clearly salient and 
one less clearly salient. They give an evolutionary justification for their role-asymmetric L0: “For early humans, 
‘looking’ problems were more generic and ‘hiding’ problems more strategic” (their footnote 13). Such a model can 
explain the main patterns in RTH’s results with only types L0, L1, and L2, if there are more L2 than L0 subjects. This 
type distribution seems lower and therefore closer to previous estimates than ours; but the difference is largely 
semantic because the behavior of their L0 is similar to that of our L1, and their L1 to that of our L2, and so on. 
  10IV. Econometric Analysis  
This section describes our econometric specification and then separately estimates the 
equilibrium with perturbations model and each possible level-k model econometrically, using the 
pooled data from RTH’s six treatments. We compare our proposed level-k model, which has a role-
symmetric L0 that favors salience, with level-k alternatives that relax the constraint that L0 is role-
symmetric, that L0 favors salience, or both. Our goal is to illustrate the models’ possibilities, not to 
take a definitive position on the behavioral parameters. Estimating the models rather than 
calibrating them constrains our discretion, and yields likelihoods that provide an objective criterion 
by which to compare models. 
Our econometric model is a mixture model as in Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) or Costa-
Gomes et al. (2001), with one type for equilibrium with perturbations and up to four for the level-k 
models. Let Xij be the total numbers of hiders or seekers (with i = h, s) who choose location j (with 
A, B, A, A denoted 1, 2, 3, 4). Let πk be the probability that a given subject is type k, and ρikj be the 
probability that a hider or seeker of type k chooses j. The full-sample likelihood can be written: 
(2)          .















The equilibrium with perturbations models have ρikj as in Section II’s analysis. Because the 
equilibrium that best fits RTH’s results is totally mixed, errors would be redundant in this case. In 
the level-k models a player’s type determines his normal choices as in Section III’s analysis, with 
ties broken uniformly randomly, so with ρikj as illustrated for our proposed model in Table 2. To 
avoid specification bias we use the simplest possible error structure: With probability ε a player 
makes an error, in which case he chooses his location uniformly randomly; errors are independent 
across players. The population choice probabilities are determined as functions of the behavioral 
parameters as in Table 2, with π0 = r, π1 = s, π2 = t, π3 = u, and π4 = v in Section III’s notation. 
In the estimation, we rule out knife-edge (p, q) combinations that make L1 hiders or seekers 
indifferent between locations, because they implicitly allow L1 to randomize, risking specification 
bias.
14 We further constrain r = 0. This constraint is not binding for our proposed model, but 
                                                 
14We distinguish between ties that occur because two location choices are expected to yield the same outcome, which 
must be broken randomly in any consequentialist theory; and ties that exist only for knife-edge (p, q) combinations. 
With a role-symmetric L0 the likelihood is occasionally maximized at such combinations because they make L1 
randomize in a way that happens to fit the data better than our (deliberately naïve) error structure. We view such 
maxima as spurious because it is implausible that there are very many subjects with such knife-edge combinations. 
  11without it many of the alternative models have identification problems and those with a role-
asymmetric L0 can achieve a near-perfect fit with r = 1, “explaining” the data by tabulating them.
15  
Given r = 0, estimating a level-k model amounts to choosing the (p, q) combination for L0, or 
equivalently the implied normal choices for L1 seekers and hiders, such that the L1 choices and the 
choices they imply for higher types maximize the likelihood, given the restrictions imposed. Figure 
3 graphs the regions in (p, q)-space for which L0 hiders or seekers yield each possible combination 
of choices for L1 hiders and seekers, numbered 1 through 6. In the most general level-k model, with 
no restriction on the role-symmetry of L0 or its response to salience, L0 hiders and seekers can be 
independently assigned to regions 1 through 6, or equivalently (Figure 3) L1 seekers’ and hiders’ 
choices can be chosen independently from {end As, central A, B}, which yields 9 possible cases.
16 
With a role-symmetric L0 but no restriction on its response to salience, L0 hiders’ and seekers’ 
regions must be the same but can otherwise be chosen freely, which yields 6 possible cases. In our 
proposed model, with a role-symmetric L0 that favors salience, this joint choice is restricted to 
regions 1 and 2, in which L1 hiders choose central A and L1 seekers choose either B (region 1, p < 
2q) or end As (region 2, p > 2q). The ρikj in these regions can be read, for given type frequencies 
and error rate, from Table 2 with r = 0; and the ρikj in other regions can be deduced from Figure 3.
17
Table 3 summarizes the parameter estimates, likelihoods, and predicted choice frequencies 
for all models, with the observed frequencies for comparison. All the models are flexible enough to 
fit RTH’s data very well.
18 Equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations fits best. Next best is a 
level-k model with a role-symmetric L0 that avoids salience, with L0 hiders and seekers both in 
region 5. This model is equivalent when estimated to the most general level-k model, with L0 
                                                 
15Only “near-perfect” because our models restrict L0’s choice probabilities to be the same for end A locations within 
each player role, so their predicted frequencies are also the same, which is not quite true in the data. Equilibrium with 
perturbations imposes an analogous restriction, so this should not bias the comparisons. Without the r = 0 constraint all 
maximum-likelihood estimates for models with a role-asymmetric L0 are equivalent to r = 1. Our proposed model 
estimates r = 0 because, while a role-asymmetric L0 can fit hiders and seekers independently, a role-symmetric L0 
cannot fit their different choices as well as higher types can. Our finding that there are no L0 subjects is consistent with 
the common finding that people underestimate others' sophistication relative to their own (Georg Weizsäcker (2003)). 
16The most general level-k model falls short of full generality only because we define the types as discussed in footnote 
9, restrict L0’s choice probabilities to be the same for end A locations within each player role, impose r = 0, and rule 
out (p, q) combinations that make L1 hiders or seekers indifferent between locations.    
17If the regions defined by p and q for hiders and seekers are each viewed as a single, discrete parameter, the most 
general level-k model has 6 independent parameters: a region each for hiders and seekers, 3 independent type 
frequencies, and an error rate. Restrictions on L0's response to salience do not affect this, while a restriction to a role-
symmetric L0 as in our proposed model reduces it to 5. Equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations, with no error rate, 
has 4 parameters; and equilibrium with restricted perturbations has 2. 
18The likelihood gap is larger than it may appear, because the log-likelihood associated with perfect prediction of the 
choice frequencies is not 0 but –1561.7—negative because in these models even perfect prediction is only probabilistic.    
  12hiders in region 4 or equivalently 5 and L0 seekers in region 6 or 5. Next is a model with a role-
asymmetric L0 with seekers favoring salience, in region 1 or 2, and hiders avoiding it, in region 4 
or 5, as in Bacharach and Stahl (1997a).
19 Next is our proposed model with a role-symmetric L0 
that favors salience, with L0 hiders and seekers both in region 2, which fits only slightly worse than 
the three previous models. Equilibrium with restricted perturbations fits worst of all.
20
The estimated payoff perturbations in the equilibrium models have the expected positive 
signs, with unrestricted magnitudes nearly twice as large for hiders as seekers. The estimated type 
distribution in our proposed level-k model is behaviorally plausible, with the characteristic hump-
shape of previous estimates but a shift toward higher, more sophisticated types (Section III). In this 
case the restriction r = 0 is non-binding, so the model also reaffirms previous findings that L0 exists 
mainly in the minds of higher types. L0, in region 2, responds more to the salience of an end A than 
a B location. ε = 0, so types L1 to L4, taken together, explain the data better than uniform errors.
21  
The estimates for the alternative Bacharach and Stahl-style model, with a role-asymmetric L0 
with seekers favoring salience and hiders avoiding it, are somewhat perverse, with plausible type 
frequencies but an error rate of ε = 0.72, and identification problems even when r = 0 (footnote 19). 
The estimates for the best-fitting alternative level-k model, with a role-symmetric L0 that 
avoids salience, are similar to those for our proposed model, again with ε = 0 but with an 
implausible type distribution of 36% L1, 9% L2, 36% L3, and 18% L4 players, far from the typical 
hump shape.  Ultimately, this alternative model will stand or fall on the plausibility of a payoff-
insensitive L0 that avoids salience and on its overfitting and portability performance.     
V. Overfitting 
This section tests for overfitting by using each model to compute separate estimates for each 
of RTH's six treatments and using the re-estimated models to “predict” the choice frequencies in 
                                                 
19In this model subscripts H and S distinguish L0 hiders' and seekers' choice probabilities. This model is unidentified 
even when r = 0, because there are linear dependencies among types' choice probabilities that are the same for hiders 
and seekers. We report an estimate constraining u = v = 0 (ruling out L3 and L4), following Bacharach and Stahl 
(1997a) in including only the lowest types, on the grounds that they are behaviorally more plausible. This choice has no 
substantive implications in RTH’s dataset, but it matters in Section VI’s analysis of portability. 
20We strongly reject the restrictions of equal magnitudes across roles (p-value 0.0022). We focus below on equilibrium 
with unrestricted perturbations, which is equivalent in RTH's games to QRE with unrestricted perturbations. 
21Without payoff perturbations our uniform errors are perfectly confounded with the equilibrium mixed strategies. Thus 
ε = 0 also suggests the absence of subjects who play equilibrium strategies, and it allows us to reject explanations in 
which some of the population choose locations with given probabilities (like L0) and the rest, like the Sophisticated 
type in Crawford (2003), play equilibrium in a game among themselves, taking those probabilities into account. 
  13the other five treatments. We evaluate the models by their mean squared prediction errors 
(“MSEs”).  
Table 4 gives the MSEs and Table A2 in the web appendix reports the estimates on which 
they are based. Even though our proposed level-k model fits slightly worse than each alternative, it 
has a lower MSE than each alternative but the Bacharach and Stahl-style level-k model with a role-
asymmetric L0 with seekers favoring salience and hiders avoiding it, whose error is 10% lower. 
VI. Portability 
This section takes up the issue of portability, the extent to which estimating the model for 
RTH’s games helps to predict behavior in other games. We use each model, with the parameters 
estimated for RTH’s games, to “predict” subjects’ initial responses in the closest analogs of RTH’s 
experiments we know of, O’Neill’s (1987) card-matching experiment and Rapoport and Boebel’s 
(1992) closely related experiment. (Their data are included in our data appendix, with permission.) 
Their games provide a good test of portability, raising the same strategic issues as RTH's games but 
with different framing, in one case five locations, and more complex win-loss patterns (Figures 4 
and 5). 
O’Neill and Rapoport and Boebel presented their games to subjects as stories, with locations 
ordered as in Figures 4 and 5. Rapoport and Boebel’s subjects were also given a matrix like Figure 
5, but with Ws or Ls for wins or losses.
22 O’Neill’s experiment had 25 subjects per role and 
Rapoport and Boebel’s had 10. Subjects played the games repeatedly in fixed pairs, with feedback 
after each play. We focus on subjects’ first-round choices, interpreting them as initial responses.
23
Tables 5 and 6 give the games’ unique equilibrium mixed strategies and subjects’ aggregate 
first-round choices. Equilibrium reflects the payoff-symmetry of actions A, 2, and 3 in O’Neill’s 
game and of actions F, I, and O in Rapoport and Boebel’s game. Equilibrium is also symmetric 
                                                 
22O’Neill’s story (p. 2708) was: “Each player has four cards—Ace, two, three, and a joker…. [Player 1] wins if there is 
a match of jokers (two jokers played) or a mismatch of number cards (two, three, for example). [Player 2] wins if there 
is a match of number cards (three, three, for example) or a mismatch of a joker (one joker, one number card).” This 
wording leaves room for doubt whether Ace was also a “number” card, but his practice rounds made it clear to the 
subjects that it was. O’Neill had only one treatment, while Rapoport and Boebel had two, which differed only in the 
scaling and expected magnitudes of payoffs in ways that do not affect the predictions of the theories considered here. 
There is a statistically significant difference between Rapoport and Boebel’s treatments for player 2s (p-value 0.0087) 
but not for player 1s (p-value 0.8557). We keep their treatments separate in both player roles.    
23Rapoport and Boebel’s subjects played first in one player role, then the other. We use only a given subject’s first 
response to the game, in either role. Even so, interpreting first-round choices as initial responses is less straightforward 
here than for RTH’s subjects, who played a game only once or in a series without feedback, because with feedback it is 
theoretically possible for first-round choices to influence future play (even with random pairing, via “contagion”). 
Nonetheless, future influences do not seem to have been an important source of distortion in this case. 
  14across player roles, as in RTH’s games. We keep symmetric actions separate because equilibrium 
with perturbations and the level-k models break the symmetries in response to differences in 
salience. Relative to equilibrium, O’Neill’s subjects have a large, positive Joker (“J”) effect for 
both players, with J even more prevalent for player 2s.
24 Rapoport and Boebel’s subjects have a 
large, positive I effect for player 1s in both treatments; a large, positive C effect for player 2s in 
treatment 1; and a large, positive L effect for player 2s in treatment 2.
25
In adapting the equilibrium model’s perturbations to O’Neill’s and Rapoport and Boebel’s 
games, we use the same general notions of salience and players’ instinctive reactions to it as for 
RTH’s games. Although O’Neill’s game is not a hide-and-seek game, player 1 (row) can be viewed 
as a hider when he chooses one of the number cards A, 2, and 3 and a seeker when he chooses J; 
and player 2 as the reverse. The end positions of A and J, and J’s unique role in the payoff 
structure, reinforce the salience of their labels. We assume a player choosing a salient card for 
which he is a seeker receives an additional payoff of α for A and ι for J; and one choosing a salient 
card for which he is a hider loses analogous payoffs (Figure 6). We constrain α, ι ≥ 0, so players 
favor salient cards for which they are seekers and avoid salient cards for which they are hiders. We 
also allow α and ι to differ across roles, but we suppress this for ease of notation.  
 If  3α – ι < 1 and α + 3ι < 2, the perturbed O’Neill game has a unique, symmetric, totally mixed 
equilibrium in which player 1s and player 2s both play A, 2, 3, and J with probabilities (1–3α+ι)/5, 
(1+2α+ι)/5, (1+2α+ι)/5, and (2–α–3ι)/5, with obvious changes if α and ι differ across roles. Either 
way, the probability of J is maximized subject to α, ι ≥ 0 when α = ι = 0, which yields an equilibrium 
J probability of 0.4, well below the observed frequency in each role. Thus, equilibrium with 
perturbations, even with new estimates of the perturbations for O’Neill’s game, cannot explain his 
subjects' initial responses better than equilibrium without perturbations, which explains them poorly.    
In adapting level-k models to O’Neill’s game we define L0 using the same notions of salience 
and players’ responses to it as for RTH's games, and the same estimated type frequencies. Thus in 
our proposed model with a role-symmetric L0 that favors salience, L0 chooses A, 2, 3, J with 
                                                 
24Discussions of O’Neill’s data have been dominated by a small, positive “Ace effect” when the data are aggregated 
over all rounds (player 1s and 2s played A 22.0% and 22.6% of the time, versus the equilibrium 20%); see for example 
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, p. 20). The Joker effect for initial responses, which is an order of magnitude larger, came 
as a surprise—a fortunate one for us because an Ace effect for player 1s is hard to square with a plausible level-k model 
(Table A3 in the web appendix). Although O’Neill speculated that “players were attracted by the powerful 
connotations of an Ace,” our analysis suggests that the aggregate Ace effect is due to learning, not salience. 
25We put less weight on Rapoport and Boebel’s effects than on O’Neill’s Joker effect because of Rapoport and 
Boebel’s smaller sample sizes and the large differences in choice frequencies across their two treatments. 
  15probabilities a, (1–a–j)/2, (1–a–j)/2, j (treating 2 and 3 equally), where a > 1/4 and j > 1/4. The 
model with a role-symmetric L0 that avoids salience is the same, but with a < 1/4 and j < 1/4. The 
Bacharach and Stahl-style model with a role-asymmetric L0 has a1 < 1/4 and j1 > 1/4 for player 1s 
(hiders when they choose A, seekers when they choose J) and a2 > 1/4 and j2 < 1/4 for player 2s.
26
  Table 5 summarizes the observed choice frequencies and the alternative models’ predicted 
frequencies and MSEs for O’Neill’s game, with equilibrium (without perturbations) as the best-
fitting equilibrium model, and using Table 3’s RTH estimates of s, t, u, v, and ε for the level-k 
models.
27 Our proposed level-k model with a role-symmetric L0 that favors salience has lower MSE 
than any of the alternatives. This model makes J modal for player 1s and 2s and in one case 
reproduces its greater prevalence for 2s, so the same behavioral assumptions we used to explain the 
prevalence of central A and its greater prevalence for seekers in RTH’s experiments explain 
O’Neill’s Joker effect. 
  Adapting the equilibrium with perturbations model to Rapoport and Boebel’s game raises 
new difficulties. Although their game is very close in structure to RTH’s and O’Neill’s games, it no 
longer makes a player unambiguously a hider or seeker for all choices, and so allows no plausible, 
parsimonious parameterization of perturbations.
28 We could use a more flexible parameterization 
and just “let the data speak.” But this would take us further from the general notions of instinctive 
reactions to salience we used to adapt the perturbations from RTH’s to O’Neill’s game, and even a 
parameterization as tight as we used for those games tends to overfit (Section V). The prospects for 
a useful equilibrium with perturbations analysis of Rapoport and Boebel’s results seem dim. 
  In adapting level-k models to Rapoport and Boebel’s game, we assume that their L0s respond 
to salience qualitatively as in RTH’s and O’Neill’s games. We assume that the abstract labels C, L, 
                                                 
26Our proposed model’s choices remain the same whenever 3a + j > 1, even if a < 1/4 or j < 1/4, with similar 
relaxations for the alternative model with a role-symmetric L0 that avoids salience and the alternative Bacharach and 
Stahl-style model with a role-asymmetric L0 that favors salience for seekers but avoids it for hiders. Figure A3 in the 
web appendix, like Figure 3 for RTH’s games, graphs the regions in (a, j)-space for which L0 yields each possible 
choice for L1 player 2s or 1s. For each model, we choose the region that is consistent with its constraints and that yields 
the best fit, given the type frequencies estimated for that model from RTH’s data. In our proposed model, a > 1/4 and j 
> 1/4 (or the weaker condition 3a + j > 1) restrict L1 player 1s and 2s to one of three choice combinations: J for player 
1s and A for player 2s (when 3j – a > 1); 2,3 for player 1s and A for player 2s (when 3j – a < 1 and a + 2j > 1); or 2,3 
for player 1s and J for player 2s (when a + 2j < 1, which given 3a + j > 1 implies 3j – a < 1). In the model with a role-
symmetric L0 that avoids salience, L1 player 1s and 2s are similarly restricted to A for player 1s and J for player 2s. In 
the Bacharach and Stahl-style model, L1 player 1s’ and 2s’ choices can be chosen independently from {A; 2,3} for 
player 1s and {A; 2,3; J} for player 2s. 
27Tables A3-A4 in the web appendix, like Table 2 for RTH’s games, gives types’ expected payoffs and choice 
probabilities for our proposed model in O’Neill’s game in the leading regions.   
  16F, I, O are not salient per se, but that the end and center locations are inherently salient (Attali and 
Bar-Hillel (2004)). Thus, in our proposed model with a role-symmetric L0 that favors salience, L0 
player 1s and 2s both choose C, L, F, I, O with probabilities m/2, (1-m-n)/2, n, (1-m-n)/2, m/2 
(again treating end locations equally), with m > 2/5 and n > 1/5. The alternative model with a role-
symmetric L0 that avoids salience is the same, but with m < 2/5 and n < 1/5.
29 However, specifying 
a Bacharach and Stahl-style model with a payoff-sensitive, role-asymmetric L0 raises difficulties 
like those for equilibrium with perturbations, in that there are no natural restrictions on m and n. 
  Table 6 summarizes the observed choice frequencies and the alternative models' predicted 
frequencies and MSEs for Rapoport and Boebel’s game, with equilibrium (without perturbations) 
as the best-fitting equilibrium model, and using Table 3’s estimates of s, t, u, v, and ε for the level-k 
models, choosing among regions as for O’Neill’s game (footnote 26). None of the models fit well, 
which may reflect the large variation in player 2s’ frequencies of C and L across their treatments. 
Our proposed level-k model has MSEs lower than equilibrium and the level-k model that avoids 
salience except for player 2s in treatment 2, which are best captured by equilibrium. Our proposed 
model reproduces a small fraction of the I effect for player 1s in both treatments and the C effect 
for player 2s in treatment 1, but it completely misses the L effect for player 2s in treatment 2. 
VII. Conclusion 
  This paper has compared alternative explanations of the systematic deviations from 
equilibrium in RTH’s experiments with hide-and-seek games with non-neutral framing of 
locations, and in O’Neill’s and Rapoport and Boebel’s experiments with closely related games. Our 
analysis explores the issues that arise in specifying level-k and alternative models for games played 
on non-neutral landscapes. It then shows that a structural non-equilibrium model of initial 
responses based on “level-k” thinking, with a payoff-insensitive anchoring L0 type, can explain 
RTH’s results, including their puzzling role-asymmetries, without assuming differences in behavior 
across roles. 
  Our proposed model fits RTH’s data slightly worse than some of the alternatives, but we find 
its explanation of their results more convincing because its assumptions seem behaviorally more 
plausible and it (alone) does not rely on unexplained role differences in behavior or payoffs. Our 
                                                                                                                                                                 
28Player 1 (2) is a seeker (hider) for location C. When C is eliminated, player 1 (2) is a hider (seeker) for location L. 
But even when L and C are eliminated, the player roles for location F cannot be classified this way. 
  17analyses of overfitting and portability give support for these subjective judgments. They also trace 
the model's advantages to two features. First, it is based on general decision rules or “types” that 
apply to any game, whose population frequencies tend to be stable across different games. Second, 
its L0 is based on simple principles—how salience is determined by the set of decisions and their 
framing, and how people respond to it—for which there is strong support, whose simplicity 
facilitates transfer to new games, just as the sensitivity to the details of the structure of alternative 
specifications of L0 or the payoff perturbations in an equilibrium model inhibit transfer.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
29In each case L1 Player 1s’ and 2s’ choices remain the same under weaker conditions. Table A5 in the web appendix 
gives types’ expected payoffs and choice probabilities for our proposed model in Rapoport and Boebel’s game in the 
leading regions.    
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Table 1. Aggregate Choice Frequencies in RTH’s Treatments 
RTH-4  A  B  A A 
Hider (53; p = 0.0026)  9%  36%  40%  15% 
Seeker (62; p = 0.0003)  13%  31%  45%  11% 
RT-AABA-Treasure A  A  B  A 
Hider (189; p = 0.0096)  22%  35%  19%  25% 
Seeker (85; p = 9E-07)  13%  51%  21%  15% 
RT-AABA-Mine A  A  B  A 
Hider (132; p = 0.0012)  24%  39%  18%  18% 
Seeker (73; p = 0.0523)  29%  36%  14%  22% 
RT-1234-Treasure 1  2  3 4 
Hider (187; p = 0.0036)  25%  22%  36%  18% 
Seeker (84; p = 3E-05)  20%  18%  48%  14% 
RT-1234-Mine 1  2  3 4 
Hider (133; p = 6E-06)  18%  20%  44%  17% 
Seeker (72; p = 0.149)  19%  25%  36%  19% 
R-ABAA A  B  A A 
Hider (50; p = 0.0186)  16%  18%  44%  22% 
Seeker (64; p = 9E-07)  16%  19%  54%  11% 
Sample sizes and p-values for significant differences from equilibrium in parentheses; salient labels in italics; order of 




Table 2. Types’ Expected Payoffs and Choice Probabilities in RTH’s Games when p > 1/2 and q > 1/4 
Hider Exp. Payoff    Choice  Pr. Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. Seeker Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. 
  p < 2q  p < 2q  p > 2q  p > 2q   p < 2q  p < 2q  p > 2q  p > 2q 
L0 (Pr. r)     L0 (Pr. r)  
A  -  p/2        - p/2  A  -  p/2 - p/2 
B  -  q  -  q  B  -  q  -  q 
A  -            1-p-q - 1-p-q  A  - 1-p-q - 1-p-q 
A  -  p/2        - p/2  A  -  p/2 - p/2 
L1 (Pr. s)     L1 (Pr. s)  
A  1 – p/2< 3/4  0  1 – p/2< 3/4  0  A  p/2 > 1/4  0  p/2 > 1/4  1/2 
B  1 – q < ¾  0  1 – q < 3/4  0  B  q > 1/4  1  q > 1/4  0 
A  p + q > ¾  1  p + q > 3/4  1  A  1–p–q < 1/4  0  1–p–q < 1/4  0 
A  1 – p/2< 3/4  0  1 – p/2< 3/4  0  A  p/2 > 1/4  0  p/2 > 1/4  1/2 
L2 (Pr. t)     L2 (Pr. t)  
A  1                1/3 1/2 0 A  0 0 0 0
B  0                0 1 1/2 B  0 0 0 0
A  1                1/3 1 1/2 A  1 1 1 1
A  1                1/3 1/2 0 A  0 0 0 0
L3 (Pr. u)     L3 (Pr. u)  
A  1                1/3 1 1/3 A  1/3 1/3 0 0
B  1                1/3 1 1/3 B  0 0 1/2 1/2
A  0                0 0 0 A  1/3 1/3 1/2 1/2
A  1                1/3 1 1/3 A  1/3 1/3 0 0
L4 (Pr. v)     L4 (Pr. v)  
A  2/3                0 1 1/2 A  1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
B  1                1 1/2 0 B  1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
A  2/3                0 1/2 0 A  0 0 0 0
A  2/3                0 1 1/2 A  1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
Total  P < 2q  p > 2q Total p < 2q p > 2q
A  Rp/2+(1-ε)[t/3+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4  rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/2]+(1-r)ε/4  A  rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4  rp/2+(1-ε)[s/2+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 
B  Rq+(1-ε)[u/3+v]+(1-r)ε/4  rq+(1-ε)[t/2+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4  B  rq+(1-ε)[s+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4  rq+(1-ε)[u/2+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 
A  r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[s+t/3]+(1-r)ε/4  r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[s+t/2]+(1-r)ε/4 A  r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[t+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4  r(1-p-q)+(1-ε)[t+u/2]+(1-r)ε/4 
A  Rp/2+(1-ε)[t/3+u/3]+(1-r)ε/4  rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/2]+(1-r)ε/4  A  rp/2+(1-ε)[u/3+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4  rp/2+(1-ε)[s/2+v/3]+(1-r)ε/4 
 Table 3. Parameter Estimates and Likelihoods for the Leading Models in RTH’s Games 
Model  Ln L  Parameter estimates  Observed or predicted choice 
frequencies  MSE 
     Pl. A  B  A  A   
Observed frequencies      H 0.2163 0.2115 0.3654 0.2067 
(624 hiders, 560 seekers)     S 0.1821  0.2054  0.4589  0.1536 
- 
Equilibrium without  -1641.4    H 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 
perturbations      S 0.2500  0.2500  0.2500  0.2500 
 
0.00970 
Equilibrium with  -1568.5 H  0.1897  0.2085  0.4122  0.1897 
restricted perturbations   
 
eH ≡ eS = 0.2187 
fH ≡ fS = 0.2010  S 0.1897  0.2085  0.4122  0.1897 
0.00084
Equilibrium with  -1562.4  H 0.2115 0.2115 0.3654 0.2115 
unrestricted perturbations   
eH = 0.2910, fH = 0.2535 
eS = 0.1539, fS = 0.1539  S 0.1679  0.2054  0.4590  0.1679 
0.00006
Level-k with a role-symmetric  -1564.4 H  0.2052  0.2408  0.3488  0.2052 
L0 that favors salience   
p > 1/2 and q > 1/4, p > 2q, 
r = 0, s = 0.1896, t = 0.3185, 
u = 0.2446, v = 0.2473, ε = 0  S 0.1772  0.2047  0.4408  0.1772 
 
0.00027 
Level-k with a role-
asymmetric L0 that  -1563.8 H  0.2117  0.2117  0.3648  0.2117 
favors salience for seekers 
and avoids it for hiders   
pH < 1/2 and qH < 1/4, 
pS > 1/2 and qS > 1/4, 
r = 0, s = 0.66, t = 0.34, ε=0.72; 
u ≡ v ≡ 0 imposed  S 0.1800  0.1800  0.4600  0.1800 
0.00017
Level-k with a role-symmetric  -1562.5 H  0.2133  0.2112  0.3623  0.2133 
L0 that avoids salience   
p < 1/2 and q < 1/4, p < 2q, 
r = 0, s = 0.3636, t = 0.0944, 
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Table 4. MSEs Treatment by Treatment in RTH’s Games 
Predicted treatment 







Mine  R-ABAA 
Level-k with symmetric L0 that favors salience: overall MSE 0.00341 
RTH-4  0.0020 0.0032 0.0098 0.0031 0.0019 0.0032
RT-AABA-Treasure  0.0070 0.0014  0.0029  0.0011 0.0004 0.0048 
RT-AABA-Mine  0.0132 0.0042  0.0011  0.0029 0.0023 0.0085 
RT-1234-Treasure  0.0072 0.0016  0.0029  0.0007 0.0002 0.0037 
RT-1234-Mine  0.0054 0.0017  0.0035  0.0009 0.0000 0.0034 
R-ABAA  0.0040 0.0023  0.0073  0.0016 0.0010 0.0023 
Equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations: overall MSE 0.00418 
RTH-4  0.0002 0.0088  0.0156  0.0079 0.0050 0.0087 
RT-AABA-Treasure  0.0089 0.0001  0.0039  0.0013 0.0017 0.0022 
RT-AABA-Mine  0.0153 0.0034  0.0005  0.0031 0.0032 0.0070 
RT-1234-Treasure  0.0076 0.0009  0.0031  0.0005 0.0004 0.0025 
RT-1234-Mine  0.0053 0.0018  0.0037  0.0009 0.0000 0.0036 
R-ABAA  0.0085 0.0019  0.0071  0.0027 0.0032 0.0004 
Level-k with symmetric L0 that avoids salience: overall MSE 0.00359 
RTH-4  0.0035 0.0062 0.0081 0.0050 0.0029 0.0054
RT-AABA-Treasure  0.0091 0.0001  0.0040  0.0012 0.0018 0.0020 
RT-AABA-Mine  0.0148 0.0033  0.0005  0.0028 0.0029 0.0067 
RT-1234-Treasure  0.0069 0.0008  0.0028  0.0007 0.0003 0.0031 
RT-1234-Mine  0.0054 0.0017  0.0035  0.0010 0.0001 0.0041 
R-ABAA  0.0073 0.0008  0.0054  0.0021 0.0023 0.0010 
Level-k  with asymmetric L0: overall MSE 0.00306 
RTH-4  0.0077 0.0016  0.0026  0.0009 0.0005 0.0025 
RT-AABA-Treasure  0.0086 0.0007  0.0038  0.0007 0.0010 0.0023 
RT-AABA-Mine  0.0085 0.0028  0.0017  0.0017 0.0007 0.0057 
RT-1234-Treasure  0.0081 0.0009  0.0029  0.0005 0.0005 0.0026 
RT-1234-Mine  0.0079 0.0014  0.0021  0.0007 0.0003 0.0034 
R-ABAA  0.0096 0.0024  0.0068  0.0025 0.0031 0.0006 
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Table 5. Comparison of the Leading Models in O’Neill’s Game 
Model Parameter  estimates  Observed  or predicted choice frequencies  MSE 
   Player A  2  3  J   
Observed frequencies    1 0.0800  0.2400  0.1200  0.5600  - 
(25 Player 1s, 25 Player 2s)    2 0.1600  0.1200  0.0800  0.6400  - 
Equilibrium without    1 0.2000  0.2000  0.2000  0.4000  0.0120 
perturbations    2 0.2000  0.2000  0.2000  0.4000  0.0200 
Level-k with a role-symmetric  a > 1/4 and j > 1/4  1 0.0824  0.1772  0.1772  0.5631  0.0018 
L0 that favors salience  3j – a < 1, a + 2j < 1  2 0.1640  0.1640  0.1640  0.5081  0.0066 
Level-k with a role-symmetric  a > 1/4 and j > 1/4  1 0.0000  0.2541  0.2541  0.4919  0.0073 
L0 that favors salience  3j – a < 1, a + 2j > 1  2 0.2720  0.0824  0.0824  0.5631  0.0050 
Level-k with a role-symmetric  a < 1/4 and j < 1/4  1 0.4245  0.1807  0.1807  0.2142  0.0614 
L0 that avoids salience    2 0.1670  0.1807  0.1807  0.4717  0.0105 
Level-k with a role-asymmetric L0 that 
favors salience for locations for which 
a1 < 1/4, j1 > 1/4; 
a2 > 1/4, j2 < 1/4  1 0.1804  0.2729  0.2729  0.2739  0.0291 
player is a seeker and avoids it for 
locations for which player is a hider 
3j1 - a1 < 1, a1+ 2j1 < 1, 
3a2 + j2 > 1  2 0.1804  0.1804  0.1804  0.4589  0.0117 
 
Table 6. Comparison of the Leading Models in Rapoport and Boebel’s Game 
Model  Parameter 




   Pl.  C  L  F  I  O     
Observed frequencies,  Tr. 1    1 0.1000 0.0000 0.2000 0.6000 0.1000  -  - 
(10 Player 1s,  10 Player 2s)    2 0.8000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1000 0.1000  -  - 
Observed frequencies,  Tr. 2    1 0.1000 0.1000 0.1000 0.6000 0.1000  -  - 
(10 Player 1s,  10 Player 2s)    2 0.2000 0.6000 0.2000 0.0000 0.0000  -  - 
Equilibrium without    1 0.3750 0.2500 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250 0.0740 0.0650 
perturbations    2 0.3750 0.2500 0.1250 0.1250 0.1250 0.0520 0.0380 
Level-k with a role-symmetric  m>2/5, n>1/5 1 0.3085 0.3488 0.0612 0.2204 0.0612 0.0660 0.0505 
L0 that favors salience  3m/2 + n  >  1 2 0.4657 0.1593 0.0618 0.2514 0.0618 0.0331 0.0702 
Level-k with a role-symmetric  m>2/5, n>1/5 1 0.3796 0.4369 0.0612 0.0612 0.0612 0.1160 0.0970 
L0 that favors salience  3m/2 + n  <  1 2 0.4107 0.2204 0.1230 0.1230 0.1230 0.0433 0.0449 
Level-k with a role-symmetric  m<2/5, n<1/5  1  0.0944  0.5420 0 0.3636 0 0.0799  0.0543 
L0 that avoids salience  2m + 3n  <  1  2 0.4864 0.1812 0.1213 0.0898 0.1213 0.0293 0.0573 
Level-k with a role-symmetric  m<2/5, n<1/5 1 0.1843 0.5462 0.0898 0.0898 0.0898 0.1156 0.0933 
L0 that avoids salience  2m + 3n  >  1  2 0.4565 0.1371 0.1355 0.1355 0.1355 0.0315 0.0642 

































Figure 1. RTH’s Hide-and-Seek Game 
 

































Figure 2. RTH’s Hide-and-Seek Game with Payoff Perturbations 
 
 
Figure 3. L1’s Through L4’s Choices in RTH’s Games as Functions of L0’s Choice 
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Figure 4. O’Neill’s Card-Matching Game 
 
Player 1/Player 2  C  L  F  I  O 


















































Figure 5. Rapoport and Boebel’s Game 
 
Player 1/Player 2  A  2 3 J
































Figure 6. O’Neill’s Card-Matching Game with Payoff Perturbations 
 
  28Web Appendix 
  This appendix provides background and more detail for “Fatal Attraction: Salience, Naiveté, 
and Sophistication in Experimental ‘Hide-and-Seek’ Games”. 
Labels with Positive or Negative Connotations and/or Focally Labeled End Locations 
Table A1 lists the choice frequencies from five additional RTH Treasure treatments with 
the same payoff structure as RTH-4 (Table 1), but labels with positive or negative connotations 
and/or focally labeled end locations. RTH-2 and RTH-5 are analogous to RTH-4 except for the 
connotations of the focal label. RTH-1 and RTH-3 are like RTH-4 except that the focal label is at 
an end position, and in RTH-3 it has a negative connotation. RTH-6 is like RTH-5 except that the 
focal label is in the third rather than second position; and is like RTH-2 and RTH-4 except for this 
difference in position and that the focal label has a positive connotation in RTH-6 but negative or 
neutral connotations in RTH-2 or RTH-4. The choice frequencies for these treatments echo those 
for the ones we analyze, with shifts in expected directions, and so provide additional evidence of 
the robustness of the patterns in RTH's data. It seems likely that our analysis could be extended to 
them by introducing and estimating payoff perturbations and/or new L0 choice probabilities. 
 
Table A1. Aggregate Choice Frequencies in RTH’s Experiments with Non-neutral Connotations 
RTH-1  Triangle  Circle Circle  Circle 
Hider (53)  23%  23%  43%  11% 
Seeker (62)  29%  24%  42%  5% 
RTH-2 Polite  Rude  Honest Friendly 
Hider (53)  15%  26%  51%  8% 
Seeker (62)  8%  40%  40%  11% 
RTH-3  Smile  Smile Smile  Frown 
Hider (53)  21%  26%  34%  19% 
Seeker (62)  7%  25%  34%  34% 
RTH-5 Frown  Smile  Frown Frown 
Hider (53)  15%  40%  34%  11% 
Seeker (62)  16%  55%  21%  8% 
RTH-6 Hate  Detest  Love  Dislike 
Hider (53)  11%  23%  38%  28% 
Seeker (62)  20%  21%  55%  14% 
Sample sizes in parentheses; salient labels in italics; order of presentation of locations to subjects as shown.  
 
 
  29Data Adjustments 
In Table 1, we made minor adjustments to RTH’s published data to reconcile reported 
frequencies and sample sizes. Hiders’ choice frequencies in RT-AABA-Treasure and RT-1234-
Treasure, and seekers’ frequencies in RT-AABA-Mine, all sum to 101%; and hiders’ frequencies in 
RT-AABA-Mine and hiders’ and seekers’ frequencies in RT-1234-Mine sum to 99%. We deal with 
this by translating the percentages into integer numbers of subjects and then rounding as needed. In 
RT-AABA-Treasure, for example, RT’s reported percentages for hiders are 22%, 35%, 19%, and 
25%, with reported sample size 189. Applying the rounded percentages to the sample size yields 
numbers of subjects 41.58, 66.15, 35.91, and 47.25, which round to 42, 66, 36, and 47, which sum 
to 191 > 189. We rounded 41.58 down to 41 and 35.91 down to 35, which is the only way to 
reconcile the sample size and the rounded reported percentages. Similarly, in RT-AABA-Mine we 
rounded 0.39×132 = 51.48 up to 52, which allows us to reconcile the sample size and reported 
percentages. Finally, in R-ABAA the reported percentages for hiders are 16%, 18%, 45%, and 
22%, which add to 101%, with a sample size of 50. This yields numbers of subjects 8, 9, 22.5, and 
11, which add to 50.5. The only way to reconcile this with one typo is to adjust the 45% to 44% as 
in Table 1, yielding numbers of subjects 8, 9, 22, and 11.  
 
Symmetry of Payoff Perturbations Across Roles for Equilibrium and QRE with 
Perturbations Models 
Here we discuss, in more detail than in Section II, the issue of symmetry of payoff 
perturbations across player roles. We focus on the equilibrium with perturbations model, but our 
discussion also applies to the QRE with perturbations model. 
There is no logical reason why a role-asymmetric payoff structure should not evoke 
instinctive aversions or attractions that differ in magnitudes as well as signs. The issue here is 
slightly different than for the symmetry across roles of L0 in our level-k model, discussed below, 
because we allow the signs of the perturbations to differ in keeping with Bacharach and Stahl’s 
(1997ab) intuition, without which equilibrium with perturbations fits the data extremely poorly; the 
only question is whether to assume that their magnitudes are the same across roles. If anything the 
case for equal magnitudes is weaker than the case for a role-symmetric L0, because hard-wired 
payoff perturbations presumably stem from an evolutionary or learning process that is surely 
influenced by payoffs as well as framing. These a priori considerations are reinforced by our strong 
  30rejection of the restriction to perturbations of equal magnitudes in RTH's dataset (Table 3) and by 
the qualitatively perverse behavior of the analogous QRE with restricted perturbations model (web 
appendix below).   
 The problem with equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations, as we see it, is that there is 
no theory that could explain (or even restrict the specification of) such differences in magnitudes. 
This makes “explaining” the role-asymmetry in RTH's subjects’ behavior (via an unexplained 
twofold role difference in magnitudes) an empirical dead end. Our overfitting and portability 
analyses make this subjective judgment more concrete, by showing that equilibrium with 
unrestricted perturbations, which has the best fit of all the models we consider in RTH's dataset 
(Table 3), does worst of all in our within-sample overfitting test (Table 4); does worse than 
equilibrium without perturbations under the natural restrictions on hiders’ and seekers’ instinctive 
reactions to salience in O’Neill’s game; and is not well-defined for Rapoport and Boebel's game.           
 
Quantal Response Equilibrium (“QRE”) with and without Payoff Perturbations 
  Here we discuss the QRE with payoff perturbations models mentioned in Section II. In a 
QRE players’ choices are noisy, with the probability of each choice increasing in its expected 
payoff given the distribution of others’ choices; a QRE is thus a fixed point in the space of players’ 
choice distributions. QRE describes the patterns of deviations from equilibrium in some other 
experiments, and so has the potential to explain RTH’s results better than equilibrium does. Its 
specification is completed by a response distribution, whose noisiness is represented (inversely) by 
a precision parameter. Some of our results are independent of this distribution, but for others we 
adopt the standard assumption of logit responses and study the special case called “logit QRE”. 
Because QRE responds only to the payoff structure, it ignores the framing of the Hide-and-
Seek game without payoff perturbations. In that game, for any error distribution, there is a unique 
QRE, which yields the same choice probabilities as equilibrium. To see this, suppose to the 
contrary that in a QRE the most probable location for Hiders, call it P, has probability greater than 
1/4. Because QRE choice probabilities increase with expected payoffs and the game is constant-
sum, P must then have the highest expected payoff for Seekers, thus probability greater than 1/4 for 
them. But then some location other than P has higher expected payoff for Hiders, a contradiction. 
We therefore consider explanations that combine logit QRE with payoff perturbations as in 
Section II’s equilibrium with perturbations analysis (Figure 2), which make QRE sensitive to the 
  31framing and give it the potential to explain RTH’s results by responding asymmetrically to the 
asymmetries in the perturbed game's payoff structure. As usual, such models must be solved 
computationally. 
QRE with perturbations does no better than equilibrium with perturbations in explaining 
RTH’s results. Figure A1 illustrates logit QRE with payoff perturbations restricted to be equal in 
magnitude but opposite in sign across player roles, as a function of the precision λ, with e = 0.2187 
and f = 0.2010, the values that best fit RTH’s data for the equilibrium with restricted perturbations 
model. (The maximum likelihood estimate of λ in the QRE with restricted perturbations model is 
effectively infinite, reducing the model to the analogous equilibrium model.) For all combinations 
of e, f = 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, or 0.4 (all consistent with a totally mixed equilibrium), as in Figure A1, the 
logit QRE probability of central A dips below 0.25 for low values of λ for seekers but never for 
hiders; and it is always higher for hiders, reversing the patterns in RTH’s data. There is enough 
structure to suggest that this result is symptomatic of a theorem, but we have been unable to prove 
it. Thus, logit QRE can explain the prevalence of central A for Hiders and Seekers with 
perturbations of equal magnitudes but opposite signs across player roles. But the main difficulty is 
explaining the greater prevalence of central A for seekers, and in this case logit QRE robustly 
predicts that central A is more prevalent for hiders. 
Like equilibrium with payoff perturbations, logit QRE can only explain RTH’s results by 
postulating large differences across player roles in the magnitudes of the perturbations e and f as 
well as their signs. But this again yields an effectively infinite estimate of λ, reducing logit QRE, in 
terms of its substantive implications, to Section II’s equilibrium with unrestricted perturbations 
model. (With payoff perturbations restricted to have equal magnitudes across player roles, the 
estimated λ→∞. With perturbations allowed to differ in magnitude across roles, for any sufficiently 
large but finite λ QRE can adjust the perturbations to match the observed frequencies exactly. Thus 
λ and the perturbations are not identified, but all parameter values that maximize the likelihood are 
equivalent to those obtained when λ→∞. With finite λ the estimated perturbations for hiders 
(seekers) are higher (lower) than those estimated for equilibrium with perturbations.) Figure A2 
illustrates logit QRE with eH = 0.2910, fH = 0.2535, and eS = fS = 0.1539, the values that give the 
best fit for this model. 
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Figure A1. QRE with Payoff Perturbations of Equal Magnitudes Across Player Roles 
 
 
Figure A2. QRE with Payoff Perturbations of Differing Magnitudes Across Player Roles 
 
Symmetry of L0 Across Roles for Level-k Models 
Here we discuss, in more detail than in Section III, the issue of symmetry of L0 across 
player roles for level-k models. 
In our view the case for a role-symmetric L0 is partly an empirical question and partly rests 
on behavioral plausibility. Assuming for the sake of argument that some kind of level-k model is 
correct, the issue is how best to describe a player’s strategic thinking with regard to the order in 
  33which he processes information about the game. One can imagine a model in which a player first 
reacts, all at once, to the game’s framing, feasible decisions, and payoffs, and so forms a payoff-
sensitive, role-asymmetric (though perhaps nonstrategic) L0; and then reacts further to the payoffs 
and strategic structure via a best-responding L1, L2, etc. But one can equally well imagine a 
compartmentalization of the thought process in which a player reacts first to the framing and 
feasible decisions, which are arguably more primitive than payoffs even in games where the 
strategic structure is as transparent as in hide-and-seek; and to payoffs only in later stages. 
 The latter compartmentalization is more in keeping with the spirit of the nonstrategic L0s 
in most of the previous level-k literature. See the uniform random L0 in Stahl and Wilson (1994, 
1995) and several subsequent analyses; the truthful and credulous L0s in Crawford (2003); and the 
truthful and random L0s in Crawford and Iriberri (2005). The role-symmetric, non-uniform random 
L0 in Ho, Camerer, and Weigelt (1998) implicitly allows payoffs to matter by not imposing 
uniformity, but does so only for symmetric games where the distinction between nonstrategic and 
payoff-insensitive doesn't matter, and doesn't try to model payoff-sensitivity or connect L0s across 
games. The one L0 in the literature that is clearly payoff-sensitive is Bacharach and Stahl's 
(1997ab), which favors salience for seekers and avoids it for hiders. 
A Bacharach and Stahl-style model fits slightly better than our favored model, and does 
10% better within RTH's sample in our overfitting test (Table 4). But it does poorly beyond sample 
in O’Neill’s game (Table 5), and it is not even well-defined for Rapoport and Boebel’s game. The 
simplicity of a payoff-insensitive L0 and the fact that its specification can be based on decision-
theoretic evidence about reactions to framing are (together with the simplicity and generality of the 
iterated best responses that define L1, etc.) the key to our level-k model’s portability, because 
different games are much more likely to have compelling analogies between their sets of feasible 
decisions and framing than between strategic structures, as would be required to transport a 
Bacharach and Stahl-style L0. 
Overfitting 
  This section gives more detail on the overfitting test discussed in Section V. Table A2 
gives the treatment by treatment parameter estimates on which the overfitting comparisons in 
Table 4 are based. The estimated type frequencies for our proposed level-k model in Table 
A2, particularly those of L4, vary widely across RTH's six treatments, which is disturbing 
because level-k types are meant to be general strategic decision rules. The estimated type 
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stable, but mainly for RTH-4 and RT-AABA-Mine. Even so, we cannot reject the constraint 
that in our proposed level-k model, the type frequencies are the same in all six RTH 
treatments, despite RTH's large samples (p-value 0.9873). This failure to reject despite the 
varying point estimates is due mainly to two factors: (i) The designs, with only one 
observation per subject in the games we study, are not well suited to identifying subjects’ 
decision rules; and (ii) L4’s and to a lesser extent L3’s frequency estimates are weakly 
identified in RTH's data because L4 never chooses central A and L3 seldom does (Table 2), 
so they are not much involved in either of the major, robust patterns in the data. 
As Table A2 shows, the parameter estimates for the other models also vary widely 
across treatments. Like the instability of the type frequencies for L3 and L4, this is probably 
due to differences in observed frequencies other than the larger ones involving central A that 
our analysis focuses on. The two treatments that differ the most from the others are RTH-4, in 
which B is chosen more than in any other treatment (Table 1, footnote 7) and RT-AABA-
Mine, in which hiders’ and seekers’ frequencies of central A differ the least. 
 
Table A2. Treatment by Treatment Parameter Estimates in RTH’s Games 
Treatment  Level-k with symmetric L0 favoring salience  Equilibrium with unrestricted 
perturbations 
  r s  T  u  v e  eH fH eS fS
RTH-4  0 0.2499 0.2643  0.4858 0.0000 0  0.3307  0.1451 0.2736  0.0377 
RT-AABA-Treasure  0 0.1577 0.3265  0.2257 0.2901 0  0.3648  0.2941 0.1164  0.1640 
RT-AABA-Mine  0 0.1566 0.3393  0.0686 0.4355 0  0.1818  0.2121 0.1028  0.2192 
RT-1234-Treasure  0 0.1572 0.3810  0.1421 0.3197 0  0.3035  0.2976 0.1471  0.1390 
RT-1234-Mine  0 0.2066 0.3153  0.2603 0.2178 0  0.2669  0.2406 0.1667  0.1111 
R-ABAA  0 0.1933 0.3743  0.2683 0.1641 0  0.4141  0.3594 0.2500  0.2600 
Treatment  Level-k with symmetric L0 avoiding salience  Level-k with asymmetric L0 
  r s  T  u  v e r  s  t  ε 
RTH-4  0 0.2897  0  0.4911  0.2192 0  0  0.7940 0.2060  0.7312 
RT-AABA-Treasure  0 0.4184 0.0668  0.3265 0.1883 0  0  0.5408 0.4592  0.6588 
RT-AABA-Mine  0 0.2176 0.4239  0  0.3585 0  0  0.8032 0.1968  0.8081 
RT-1234-Treasure  0 0.3761 0.0822  0.3816 0.1601 0  0  0.6091 0.3909  0.6984 
RT-1234-Mine  0 0.3797 0.0334  0.4745 0.1124 0  0  0.6804 0.3196  0.7419 
R-ABAA  0 0.3925 0.0337  0.3326 0.2412 0  0  0.7300 0.2700  0.6042 
  35This section gives background on Section VI’s portability analysis. Figure A3 and Tables 
A3-A4 give the details of types’ choices in the best-fitting regions for our proposed level-k model 
in O’Neill’s game, just as Figure 3 and Table 2 did for RTH’s games. Table A5 gives the details of 
types’ choices in the best-fitting regions for our proposed model in Rapoport and Boebel’s game. 
  36
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Figure A3. L1's Choices in O’Neill's Game as Functions of L0’s Choice Probabilities a and j 
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L1 2: 2, 3 Table A3. Types’ Expected Payoffs and Choice Probabilities in O’Neill’s Game when 3j - a< 1 
Player 1  Exp. Payoff Choice  Pr.  Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. Player 2  Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. 
   A+ 2j < 1  a+ 2j < 1  a+ 2j > 1  a+ 2j > 1    a+ 2j < 1  a+ 2j < 1  a+ 2j > 1  a+ 2j > 1 
L0 (Pr. R)     L0 (Pr. r)  
A  -  a  -  A  A  -  a  -  a 
2  -            (1-a-j)/2 - (1-a-j)/2  2  - (1-a-j)/2 - (1-a-j)/2 
3  -            (1-a-j)/2 - (1-a-j)/2  3  - (1-a-j)/2 - (1-a-j)/2 
J  -  j  -  J  J  -  j  -  j 
L1 (Pr. s)     L1 (Pr. s)  
A  1-a-j  0  1-a-j  0  A  a+j        0 a+j 1
2  (1+a-j)/2  1/2   (1+a-j)/2  1/2  2  (1-a+j)/2        0 (1-a+j)/2 0
3  (1+a-j)/2            1/2 (1+a-j)/2 1/2 3  (1-a+j)/2  0 (1-a+j)/2  0 
J   J  0   J  0  J  1-j  1  1-j  0 
L2 (Pr. t)     L2 (Pr. t)  
A  0                0 0 0 A  0 0 0 0
2  0                0 1 1/2 2  ½ 0 1/2 0
3  0                0 1 1/2 3  ½ 0 1/2 0
J  1        1 0 0 J  1  1  1  1 
L3 (Pr. u)     L3 (Pr. u)   
A  0                0 0 0 A  1 1/3 0 0
2  0                0 0 0 2  1 1/3 1/2 0
3  0                0 0 0 3  1 1/3 1/2 0
J  1                1 1 1 J  0 0 1 1
L4 (Pr. v)     L4 (Pr. v)   
A  2/3                1/3 0 0 A  1 1/3 1 1/3
2  2/3                1/3 0 0 2  1 1/3 1 1/3
3  2/3                1/3 0 0 3  1 1/3 1 1/3
J  0                0 1 1 J  0 0 0 0
Total   a+2j < 1  a+2j > 1 Total  a+2j < 1 a+2j > 1
A  ra+(1-ε)[v/3] + (1-r) ε/4  ra+ (1-r) ε/4  A ra+(1-ε) [u/3+v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  ra+(1-ε) [s+v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4 
2  r(1-a-j)/2+ (1-ε) [s/2+v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  r(1-a-j)/2+ (1-ε) [s/2+t/2]+ (1-r) ε/4  2  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε) [u/3+v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε) [v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4 
3  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε) [s/3+v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  r(1-a-j)/2+ (1-ε) [s/2+t/2]+ (1-r) ε/4  3  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε) [u/3+v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε) [v/3]+ (1-r) ε/4 
J  Rj+(1-ε) [t+u]+ (1-r) ε/4  rj+(1-ε) [u+v]+ (1-r) ε/4  J  rj+(1-ε) [s+t]+ (1-r) ε/4  rj+(1-ε) [t+u]+ (1-r) ε/4 
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Table A4. Types’ Expected Payoffs and Choice Probabilities in O’Neill’s Game when 3j – a > 1 
Player 1  Exp. Payoff    Choice Pr. Player 2 Exp. Payoff Choice Pr.
L0 (Pr. R)   L0 (Pr. r)
A  -  a  A  -  a 
2  -    (1-a-j)/2  2  - (1-a-j)/2 
3  -    (1-a-j)/2  3  - (1-a-j)/2 
J  -  j  J  -  j 
L1 (Pr. S)   L1 (Pr. s)
A  1-a-j  0  A  a+j    1
2  (1+a-j)/2  0  2  (1-a+j)/2    0
3  (1+a-j)/2  0  3  (1-a+j)/2  0 
J   j  1  J  1-j  0 
L2 (Pr. T)   L2 (Pr. t)
A  0        0 A  1 1/3
2  1        1/2 2  1 1/3
3  1        1/2 3  1 1/3
J  0    0 J  0  0 
L3 (Pr. U)   L3 (Pr. u)
A  2/3        1/3 A  0 0
2  2/3        1/3 2  1/2 0
3  2/3        1/3 3  1/2 0
J  0        0 J  1 1
L4 (Pr. V)   L4 (Pr. v)
A  0        0 A  1/3 0
2  0        0 2  1/3 0
3  0        0 3  1/3 0
J  1        1 J  1 1
Total     Total
A  Ra+(1-ε)[u/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  A  ra+(1-ε)[s+t/3]+ (1-r) ε/4 
2  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε)[t/2+u/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  2  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε)[t/3] + (1-r) ε/4 
3  R(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε)[t/2+ u/3]+ (1-r) ε/4  3  r(1-a-j)/2+(1-ε)[t/3]+ (1-r) ε/4 
J  Rj+(1-ε)[s+v]+ (1-r) ε/4  J  rj+(1-ε)[u+v]+ (1-r) ε/4 
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Player 1  Exp. Payoff Choice  Pr.  Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. Player 2 Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. Exp. Payoff Choice Pr. 
 3 m/2+n>1    3m/2+n>1 3m/2+n<1 3m/2+n<1 3m/2+n>1 3m/2+n>1 3m/2+n<1 3m/2+n<1 
L0 (Pr. r)     L0 (Pr. r)  
C  -  m/2  - m/2 C - m/2 - m/2 
L  -  (1-m-n)/2  - (1-m-n)/2 L - (1-m-n)/2 - (1-m-n)/2 
F  -  n  - n F - N - n 
I  -  (1-m-n)/2  - (1-m-n)/2 I - (1-m-n)/2 - (1-m-n)/2 
O   m/2  m/2 O m/2 m/2 
L1 (Pr. s)     L1 (Pr. s)  
C  m/2  0  m/2 0 C 1-m/2 0 1-m/2 1 
L  1/2+n/2  1 1/2+n/2 1 L 1/2-n/2 0 1/2-n/2 0 
F  1/2-n/2  0 1/2-n/2 0 F 1/2+n/2 0 1/2+n/2 0 
I  1-m-n  0 1-m-n 0 I m+n 1 m+n 0 
O  (1-m+n)/2  0  (1-m+n)/2 0 O (1+m-n)/2 0 (1+m-n)/2 0 
L2 (Pr. t)     L2 (Pr. t)  
C  0    1½ 1 1 / 2   0 1 1 C
L  1    1½ 1 1 / 2   1/2 0 0 L
F  0    00 0 0   0 0 0 F
I  1    00 0 0   1/2 0 0 I
O  0    00 0 0   0 0 0 O
L3 (Pr. u)     L3 (Pr. u)  
C  ½    11 0 0   1/4 1/2 1/4 C
L  0    ½0 1 1 / 4   0 0 0 L
F  ½    ½0 1 1 / 4   1/4 1/2 1/4 F
I  ½    00 1 1 / 4   1/4 1/2 1/4 I
O  ½    1/4 1/2 1/4 O 1/2 0 1 1/4 
L4 (Pr. v)     L4 (Pr. v)  
C  1    1 0 0 C 3/4 ¼ 3/4 1/4 
L  0    00 1 / 4 0   0 3/4 1 L
F  0    0 1/2 0 F 3/4 ¼ 3/4 1/4 
I  0    0 1/2 0 I 3/4 ¼ 3/4 1/4 
O  0    0 1/2 0 O 3/4 ¼ 3/4 1/4 
Total  3m/2+n>1 3m/2+n<1 Total  3m/2+n>1 3m/2+n<1
C  rm/2+(1-ε)[u/4+v]+ (1-r)ε/5 rm/2+(1-ε) [t+u/4]+ (1-r)ε/5 C rm/2+(1-ε) [t/2+u+v/4]+ (1-r)ε/5 rm/2+(1-ε) [s+t/2+v/4]+ (1-r)ε/5 
L  r(1-m-n)/2+(1-ε) [s+t/2]+ (1-r)ε/5  r(1-m-n)/2+(1-ε) [s+v]+ (1-r)ε/5 L r(1-m-n)/2+(1-ε) [t/2]+ (1-r) ε/5 r(1-m-n)/2+(1-ε) [t/2+u/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 
F  rn +(1-ε) [u/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 rn +(1-ε) [u/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 F rn +(1-ε) [v/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 rn +(1-ε) [u/4+v/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 
I  r(1-m-n)/2+(1-ε) [t/2+u/4] (1-r) ε/5  r(1-m-n)/2 +(1-ε) [u/4] (1-r) ε/5 I r(1-m-n)/2+(1-ε) [s+v/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 r(1-m-n)/2+(1-ε) u/4+v/4]+ (1-r)ε/5 
O  rm/2+(1-ε) [u/4]+ (1-r)ε/5 rm/2  +(1-ε) [u/4]+ (1-r)ε/5 O rm/2+(1-ε) [v/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 rm/2+(1-ε) [u/4+v/4]+ (1-r) ε/5 
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